Shen, Hui (Argonne National Laboratory), Lin, Jane (University of Illinois Chicago)

Optimal Matching Based Double Auction in a Two-Sided CrowdShipping Market

Scheduled for presentation during the Invited Session "Large-scale Smart Mobility" (FrAT2), Friday, September 27, 2024, 10:30−10:50, Salon 5

2024 IEEE 27th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), September 24- 27, 2024, Edmonton, Canada

This information is tentative and subject to change. Compiled on December 26, 2024

Abstract

In the core problem of a two-sided crowshipping (CS) market, matching the senders with couriers to satisfy the preferences on both sides is essential. In the most existing crowd-sourcing mobility services, the matching is typically one-sided. This study proposes an optimal matching based double auction (OMDA) mechanism to allocate two parties by increasing resource utilization. Both senders’ and couriers’ preferences of CS delivery requests are satisfied in the auction. The OMDA mechanism decides the final transaction fee, the amounts that senders should pay and that couriers should receive, by balancing the preferences on both sides. In addition to the delivery price, other important non-monetary features are also considered in the mechanism, including the package size, spare vehicle space, expected reputation for the matching courier, location, and delivery time. The proposed OMDA mechanism satisfies three economic properties in a fair auction market, individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. Finally, an experiment based on a real-world CS dataset is conducted to evaluate the mechanism.